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Abstract: 
After decades of neglect, the rule of law is much on the minds of legal scholars 
today.  In the United States, the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Bush v. Gore 
has triggered renewed interest in understanding the concept of the rule of law and its 
value to society.  Transition and developing economies have increasingly come to 
recognize the importance of the rule of law in establishing a framework for economic 
growth and individual liberty.  This essay provides an overview of these debates over 
the concept and consequences of the rule of law.  Although American scholars have 
criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore as violative of the rule of law, 
this criticism rests on an erroneous understanding of the rule of law.  The tradition of the 
rule of law, as expressed by Dicey, Oakeshott, Hayek, and others, is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore.  Moreover, this tradition of the rule of law is 
a cornerstone of a free and prosperous society, in America and abroad. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
After decades of neglect, the rule of law is much on the minds of legal scholars today.  
In the United States, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore has triggered a 
renewed interest in the Anglo-American tradition of the rule of law.
1  In the emerging 
democratic capitalist countries of Eastern Europe, societies have struggled to rediscover 
the rule of law after decades of Communist tyranny.
2  In the developing countries of 
Latin America, the publication of Hernando de Soto’s brilliant book The Mystery of 
Capital
3 has initiated a fervor of scholarly and political interest in the importance and 
the challenge of nurturing the rule of law.  In the dismal, impoverished kleptocracies of 
Africa, the challenge is even greater and the lack of even embryonic rule of law 
institutions is stark. 
It has become e vident that the rule of law matters for economic growth and 
individual liberty.  Yet the concept of the rule of law remains somewhat uncertain, as 
does the way in which the rule of law translates into freedom and prosperity.  Part II will 
describe the concept of the rule of law that will provide a working definition for the 
concepts used in this symposium.  Part III will discuss the meaning and importance of 
the rule of law in the wake of Bush v. Gore.  Part IV will summarize the recent findings 
of the relationship between the rule of law, freedom, and economic development for 
                                                 
1 Bush v. Gore, 121 S Ct 525 (2000). 
2 The term “democratic capitalism”  is taken from Michael Novak’s book  The Spirit of Democratic 
Capitalism and is meant to refer to a society oriented around free markets, democratic political 
institutions, freedom of association in the sphere of civil society, and constitutional government.  See 
Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (Madison Books, 1982) ("Novak, Spirit"). 
3 Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere 




purposes of applying the foregoing discussion to developing countries.  Part IV 
concludes. 
 
II.  THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Commentators on the rule of law often insist that it is difficult to define the concept of 
the rule of law.
4  This is untrue.  Although there may be disagreement over the 
importance or desirability of the rule of law as a virtue, there is a fairly well-understood 
core understanding of its meaning.  Indeed, the fact that the rule of law has spawned so 
many detractors indicates that its meaning is well-understood among both enthusiasts 
and detractors. 
Since Dicey restated the rule of law in the late Nineteenth Century in application 
to modern constitutional republics, there has been a general agreement as to the content 
and meaning of the rule of law.
5  Dicey identified three fundamental characteristics of 
the rule of law as it emerged in Britain: (1) the supremacy of regular law as opposed to 
arbitrary power, i.e., the rule of law, not men; (2) equality before the law of all persons 
and classes, including governmental officials; and (3) the incorporation of constitutional  
                                                 
4 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum L 
Rev 1 (1997) ("The Rule of Law is a historic ideal, and appeals to the Rule of Law remain rhetorically 
powerful.  Yet the precise meaning of the Rule of Law is perhaps less clear than ever before."); Margaret 
Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 BU L Rev 781, 781 (1989) ("Although the Rule of Law 
ideal is central to our legal tradition, it is deeply contested.  Among those who affirm the traditional ideal 
there is no canonical formulation of its meaning . . . ."). 
5 Dicey's characterization of the modern content of the rule of law may be distinguished from the ancient 
"classical" conception of the rule of law, such as found in Aristotle.  For a summary of the ancient version 
of the rule of law and a comparison with the modern rule of law, see Judith Shklar, Political Theory and 
the Rule of Law, in The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology 1 (Carswell Publishing, 1987).  This article will 
concern itself only with the modern version of the rule of law.  Just as the modern understanding of 
"liberty" is distinguishable from the classical understanding, so too the modern understanding of the rule 
of law, thus it is not necessary to dwell on the classical understanding of the rule of law here.  See 
Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns (1819), in Benjamin 
Constant, Political Writings 309 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., Cambridge U Press, 1988).  In fact, 
Constant points to liberty under the rule of law as a defining characteristic of the modern form of liberty.  
Given the irrelevance of the ancient's understanding of the rule of law to modern debates, any references 
to the "traditional" or "classical" statement of the rule of law in this essay should be understood to refer to 




law as a binding part of the ordinary law of the land.
6  Although Dicey spoke primarily 
to the historical development of the rule of law in Britain, the core understanding of the 
rule of law that he articulated has remained remarkably stable since he wrote and has 
been readily generalizable to a universal understanding of the rule of law.  There has 
been some updating and clarification, but he identified many of the values of the rule of 
law that comprise its core meaning today.  Any ambiguity as to the meaning of the rule 
of law, therefore, perhaps is best understood as not a disagreement over the meaning or 
importance of the rule of law; rather, this perceived ambiguity arises from the attempts 
of critics of the rule of law to redefine the core meaning of the rule of law to try to 
accomplish goals that are simply incompatible with the rule of law.
7 
This core and traditional definition of the rule of law contains three basic values or 
concepts: (1) constitutionalism; (2) rule-based decision-making; and (3) a commitment 
to neutral principles, such as federalism, separation of powers, and textualism.
8  Even 
though each of these three concepts are interrelated, it is useful to distinguish them for 
purposes of understanding their role in thinking about the rule of law. 
 
A.  Constitutionalism 
 
The first value of the rule of law is the notion of constitutionalism, comprising 
procedural and substantive limitations on the exercise of governmental authority.  
                                                 
6 See A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 107–22 (Liberty Classics 
Reprint of 8th ed., 1915) ("Dicey,  Study"); Lawrence B. Solum,  The Law of Rules: A Critique and 
Reconstruction of Justice Scalia's View of the Rule of Law (Loyal Law School (Los Angeles) Public Law 
and Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 2002-5, March 2002),  available in 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=303575 (summarizing Dicey's views) ("Solum, Law of Rules"). 
7 See Guri Ademi, Legal Intimations: Michael Oakeshott and the Rule of Law, 1993 Wis L Rev 839, 843 
(noting tendency of many to confuse rule of law with other values). 
8 This list of attributes is similar to that provided by Ronald Cass in his brilliant and comprehensive recent 
study of the rule of law in America.  Cass lists the following four traits of the rule of law: (1) fidelity to 
rules, (2) of principled predictability (3) embedded in valid authority (4) that is external to individual 
government decision makers."  Ronald A. Cass, The Rule of Law in America 4 (Johns Hopkins U, 2001) 
("Cass, Rule of Law").  Cass's definition and elaboration is more extensive then the summary description 
provided in this essay.  See also Norman Barry, The Classical Theory of Law, 73 Cornell L Rev 283, 287 
(1988) ("Justice in classical law is the impartial application of universal rules, rules that do not 
discriminate and which privilege no person or groups.  The point about classical law is that it is 'neutral' 
with regard to the various outcomes that emerge from a rule-governed process; legality is doing justice to 




Constitutionalism in this context refers to the notion that government power is 
constrained by "the law," an external force to which political decision-making must 
abide.  In particular, the rule of law constrains arbitrary action by political actors that is 
not  taken  pursuant  to  established  rules  and procedures announced prior to the action.   
Government under the rule of law preserves individual freedom; government without 
the rule of law is tyranny, in that it leaves individuals subject to the arbitrary will of 
rules.  As one observer has noted, "The rule of law is a solution to a problem, and as the 
classical tradition has always recognized, the problem is tyranny—the social relationship 
in which some people can command the lives or property of others at will and in pursuit 
of discretionary ends."
9  Whereas rule of law critics see government discretion as 
desirable and necessary to achieve egalitarian social goals, rule of law adherents fear the 
arbitrary exercise of government discretion and seek to constrain it.  In this sense, 
therefore, the rule of law is consistent with the values of constitutionalism, namely 
placing limits on government action so as to restrain the discretion of government 
officials.
10 
The most forceful advocate of the constitutionalism values of the rule of law was 
F.A. Hayek.  Hayek identified several characteristics of the rule of law.  First, the rule of 
law requires that government action be “bound by rules fixed and announced 
beforehand.”
11  Second, rules must be known and certain, so that individuals can 
conform their behavior to those laws.
12  Third, the rule of law requires equality in the 
sense that the law applies equally to all persons and does not prejudice some categories 
of people at the expense of others.
13  The law may discriminate among different 
categories of people as necessary, but may not do so in such a way as to prejudice some 
or elevate some groups or individuals to the detriment of others. 
                                                 
9 See Noel B. Reynolds, Grounding the Rule of Law, 2 Ratio Juris 1, 5 (1989) 
10 See A.C. Pritchard and Todd J. Zywicki,  Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of 
Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 NC L Rev 409, 446–51 (1999) (discussing efficiency 
purposes of constitutions). 
11 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 72 (U Chicago, 1944). 
12 Friedrich A. Hayek,  The Constitution of Liberty 208 (U Chicago, 1960) ("Hayek,  Constitution of 
Liberty"). 




The rule of law is therefore inherently a classical liberal concept that presupposes 
the need and desirability to constrain governmental actors and maximize the sphere of 
liberty for  private  ordering, both  in  economic exchange  as  well  as  in  the  voluntary  
institutions that comprise civil society.
14  Law is not consciously designed to accomplish 
some social goal.  Instead, law is conceived as a purpose-independent system designed 
as an input into individuals’ decision-making.  In  Michael Oakeshott's memorable 
phrase, "The rule of law bakes no bread, it is unable to distribute loaves or fishes (it has 
none), and it cannot protect itself against external assault, but it remains the most 
civilized and least burdensome conception of a state yet to be devised."
15  Law is a 
means to the accomplishment of individual goals, not an end in itself.
16  Thus, law can 
only be means for individuals to use to accomplish their individual goals, not a means 
for society or the state to accomplish their goals, because these entities can have no ends 
of their own.
17   
The inherent relationship between the rule of law and individual liberty is often 
misunderstood by those who insist that the rule of law need not be liberty-enhancing.  
At the same time, many advocates of the rule of law have justified it as a means to the 
end limited government and economic prosperity.  But Oakeshott cogently observes, 
these arguments from both the left and right misunderstand the nature of the rule of law.  
The rule of law should not be understood as a mere means to a social order predicated 
on limited government, freedom, and prosperity.  Instead, the rule of law an inherent 
part of a free, peaceful, and prosperous society.  A society organized under the rule of 
law is a "liberal" order of private ordering and constitutional limits on government; 
conversely, the rule of law can exist only in such an order.  Thus, the rule of law and a 
                                                 
14 Horwitz characterizes it as a “conservative doctrine,” but one supposes that he really means 
“conservative” in its more generic terminology, rather than to distinguish it from classical liberalism. 
Morton J. Horwitz, Book Review, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 Yale L J 561, 566 
(1977).  Burke, Maine, Hayek, and Oakeshott were all advocates of the rule of law; all are often 
characterized as conservatives, although it is not clear that this appellation is always accurate.  See Hayek, 
Constitution of Liberty at 397–411 (“Postscript: Why I am Not a Conservative”) (cited in note 12). 
15 Michael Oakeshott, The Rule of Law, in On History: And Other Essays 119, at 164  (Barnes & Noble 
Books, 1983) ("Oakeshott, Rule of Law"). 
16 See id at 161; see also Nigel Ashford, Michael Oakeshott and the Conservative Disposition, 25 The 




liberal order are inextricably intertwined: neither can exist without the other. It is worth 
considering Oakeshott's observations on this point in detail to understand the argument  
being advanced.  Oakeshott observes: 
 
Many writers who have undertaken to recommend this vision of a state 
[limited government] have sought its virtue in what they present as a 
consequence, something valuable which may be enjoyed as the outcome 
of this mode of association [i.e., society organized under the rule of 
law].  And some have suggested that its virtue is to be instrumental to 
the achievement of "prosperity" understood as the maximum continuous 
satisfaction of the wants of the associates.  But the more discerning 
apologists (recognizing the inconsistency of attributing the virtue of a 
non-instrumental mode of association to its propensity to produce, 
promote or e ven encourage a substantive condition of things) have 
suggested that its virtue is to promote a certain kind of "freedom."
18 
 
But these "apologists" also miss the point, according to Oakeshott.  He argues that these 
justifications for the rule of law are "misleading," in that they justify the rule of law as a 
means to a social end, rather than recognizing the rule of law as an inherent element of a 
certain type of political order.  He continues: 
 
These rules certainly do not themselves prescribe purposes to  be 
pursued or actions to be performed.  They do not concern the motives of 
conduct,  and  this  mode  of  association  is  in  terms of the recognition 
of  obligations,  not  their uninterrupted observance; and all this may be 
said  to   denote  a  certain  kind  of   "freedom" which excludes only the 
freedom  to  choose  one's  obligations.  But  this  "freedom"   does   not  
                                                                                                                                               
17 See James M. Buchanan,  The Constitutional Way of Thinking, 10 S Ct Econ Rev (this volume); 
Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (Wiley, 1951). 




follow as a consequence of this mode of association; it is inherent in its 
character.  And this is the case also with other common suggestions: 
that the virtue of this mode of association is its consequential "peace" 
(Hobbes) or "order."  A certain kind of "peace" and "order" may, 




Notwithstanding Oakeshott's admonitions, the rule of law in fact does have the 
beneficial consequence of producing both individual freedom and economic 
prosperity.
20  The rule of law enhances individual freedom by permitting individuals to 
choose and pursue their own ends in life, without improper influence from the state.  
Because the law speaks only to the means that individuals can use to achieve their 
personal aspirations, the purpose-independent rules of the rule of law permits a 
maximum flourishing of individual choice.  This includes preservation of the sphere of 
civil society, so as to allow individuals to form their own families and groups to 
accomplish their social and moral purposes.
21 
The rule of law places inherent limitations on the size and scope of government 
intrusiveness into the economy and civil society.  As both an empirical and a priori 
matter, heavy regulation of the economy is inconsistent with compliance with the rule of 
law.   Heavy  regulation   also  is   inherently  arbitrary  and  corrupt  regulation.   Where  
there   is  heavy  regulation  of  economic  activity,  it  is   fundamentally  impossible   to  
                                                 
19 Id; see also Barry, 73 Cornell L Rev at 39 (cited in note 8) ("Law is intimately connected with freedom 
in classical law, not just in the trivial sense that a free society is a rule-governed order which diminishes 
the coercive power that political authorities have over individuals, but also in the theoretical sense than an 
explanation for liberty can be given which makes freedom and law consistent."). 
20 It may be possible to square Oakeshott's position on the rule of law with a consequentialist justification 
of the rule of law through the mechanism of group selection.  Although this reconciliation goes beyond the 
scope of this essay, one could argue that societies organized by the rule of law will simply displace other 
societies through a process similar to Darwinian evolution, thereby combining both the essentialist and 
consequentialist justifications into an evolutionary justification.  This seems to be Hayek's position.  See 
Todd J. Zywicki, Was Hayek Right About Group Selection After All?, 13 Rev Austrian Econ 81 (2000).  
Oakeshott hints at this possible reconciliation through his suggestion that the rule of law is an historical 
and empirical concept that philosophy can illuminate, not a concept to be created by philosophy.  See 
Oakeshott, Rule of Law at 164 (cited in note 15). 




realistically comply with all the regulatory requirements and to still engage in any 
economic activity.  In many countries around the world it is practically impossible to get 
all of the licenses that are necessary in order to conduct business legally.  It can take 
years, several thousands of dollars, and the satisfaction of multiple bureaucrats before a 
business can open legally.  In these countries, the permit fees and opportunity cost of 
missing work to shuttle among governmental offices renders it economically unrealistic 
to be able to satisfy all the requirements.  At that point an aspiring entrepreneur has two 
options: either to operate illegally or to bribe the relevant governmental officials to 
circumvent the formal processes to illegally qualify the entrepreneur to open the 
business.  If the business operates illegally, of course, this simply means that the 
business is in constant danger of being shut-down by the executive branch.  In order to 
prevent this, it will often be necessary to bribe enforcement officials to allow the 
business to continue operating.  One investigator concluded that owners of extralegal 
businesses in Peru paid 10-15% of their gross income in bribes and commissions in 
order to persuade law enforcement officials not to shut them down.
22  Either way, the 
sheer weight and intrusiveness of a heavy regulatory scheme leads to corruption and 
unequal enforcement of the law.  It is impossible to satisfy all of the requirements, thus 
for economic activity to function it becomes necessary for some government officials to 
decide which requirements must be satisfied, which will be waived, and which 
applicants will be the beneficiaries of these waivers.
23  Thus, pervasive economic 
regulation invariably produces corruption in regulatory officials.
24 
Economically unsophisticated commentators have often been confused by the 
relationship between the rule of law and economic reality.  Joseph Raz, for instance, 
criticizes this reasoning on the ground that even if the policies are economically 
                                                 
22 Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World 154 (Harper & Row, 
1989) ("de Soto, Other Path"). 
23 Hayek observes in a related context, such decisions must “necessarily be discretionary and must consist 
of  ad hoc decisions that discriminate between persons on essentially arbitrary grounds.”  Hayek, 
Constitution of Liberty at 228 (cited in note 12). 
24 See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer,  The 
Regulation of Entry, 117 Q J Econ 1, 26 (2002) (finding statistical correlation between intensity of 
economic regulation and political corruption); Alejandro A. Chaufen and Eugenio Guzman, Economic 




misguided, that does not make them violative of the rule of law if they are principled 
and announced beforehand.
25  On the narrow ground of the initial promulgation of the 
rule of law, Raz may be correct.  Moreover, to the extent that ill-advised regulations are 
constrained in number and scope, then they need not violate the rule of law.  But Raz 
clearly means believes that extensive economic regulation is compatible with the rule of 
law. 
Raz's confidence ignores the fact that economics is subject to its own set of "laws" 
and that excessive economic regulation will run afoul of the empirical regularities of 
economics.  As a result, excessive economic regulation s imply cannot be applied 
consistently with the rule of law.  The rule of law requires that individuals be able to 
practically conform their behavior to the laws.  As a result, it would be inconsistent with 
the rule of law to require a person to hold his breath for four days in order to avoid 
criminal punishment or to require an applicant to stand on one foot for three weeks 
straight in order to receive a business license.  But just as the rule of law implicitly 
requires conformity with the constraints of the physical world, so too with the economic 
world.
 26  Consider a law that required that in order to receive a business license, one 
must stand on one foot nonstop for three weeks straight.  Such a law would be 
principled and theoretically possible.  But it is a practical impossibility.  In order for 
economic activity to occur, therefore, there will have to be some ad hoc waivers of 
"three-week leg-standing" policy.  This would fail the test of the rule of law, Raz 
observes, because that for the rule of law to prevail “it must be capable of guiding the 
behaviour of its subjects.”
27  But his lack of knowledge about the necessities of 
economic activity causes him to misunderstand the ways in which economic regulation 
interferes with the market process and thereby undermines the rule of law. 
Hernando  de  Soto,  the  President of  Peru's  Institute for Liberty and Democracy,  
                                                 
25 See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 210, 228 (Oxford 
U Presss, 1979) ("Raz, Rule of Law"). 
26 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale U, rev ed 1969) ("Fuller, Morality of Law"). 
27 Raz,  Rule of Law at 214 (cited in note 25).  Fuller similarly observes that there is a reciprocal 
understanding between the governors and the governed: "the governed have a duty to obey the law, and 
those who govern have a duty to provide laws of a sort that can be obeyed."  Cass, Rule of Law at 11 




constructed several teams of researchers to investigate the difficulty of doing business 
within the law in a variety of societies.
28  His findings were striking and demonstrate the 
way in which pervasive economic regulation is not only economically unwise but also 
violative of the rule of law in application.  De Soto started by trying to open a garment 
shop in Lima, Peru in compliance with all of the relevant laws.
29  It took de Soto's 
researchers six hours per day and 289 days to stand in all of the lines and fill out all of 
the paperwork necessary to open a small business.  In other words, in order to start a 
new business, a prospective entrepreneur would be required to work full-time for almost 
one year merely shuttling from one office to another and filling out forms.  Moreover, 
the garment shop was geared to operate with only one worker, yet the cost of legal 
registration was $1,231—thirty-one times the monthly minimum wage.  Obtaining legal 
authorization to build a house on state-owned land took six years and eleven months and 
required 207 different administrative steps involving fifty-two government offices.  
Obtaining legal title for the land itself required 728 steps.  Such burdens appear to be 
common throughout much of the world.  In the Dominican Republic, for instance, the 
official cost of legally registering a new business is an astounding 4.6 times per capita 
GDP.
30 
Even if a company is opened legally, it still faces the challenge of remaining 
legal.
31  Legal businesses in Peru spend $76.70 of every $100 in their operating revenues 
just complying with legal requirements.  Of this amount, only $17.60 goes to pay taxes; 
the remaining $59.10 is spent on other legal costs, such as filling out paperwork and 
other administrative and bureaucratic burdens. 
In such societies, it is essentially impossible to conduct business in compliance 
with the law, because the sheer weight of regulations overburdens efforts to try to 
conduct business in compliance with the law.  This means that virtually all small 
businesses and most medium-sized  businesses  will  have  to  operate outside the law or  
                                                 
28 De Soto, Mystery of Capital at 18–28 (cited in note 3); see also de Soto, Other Path at 131–87 (cited in 
note 22). 
29 De Soto, Mystery of Capital at 19–20 (cited in note 3). 
30 Djankov et al, 117 Q J Econ at 4 (cite in note 24). 




not operate at all.  Not only does this make the businesses illegal, but it also denies the 
business the other benefits of legality, such as contract enforcement, the ability to pledge 
assets as collateral for a loan, and the like.  As a result, the entire operation becomes 
"extra-legal" operating wholly outside the law and reliant purely on informal norms and 
self-executing contract performance mechanisms for success.  Indeed, the extralegal 
sector eventually replaces the legal sector as the hub of economic and social activity.  
"The extralegal world is typically viewed as a place where gangsters roam, sinister 
characters of interest only to police, anthropologists, and missionaries.  In fact it is 
legality that is marginal; extralegality has become the norm."
32   
In fact, the entire process appears to be as pointless as a three-week leg-standing 
law: de Soto notes with amusement that despite all of these forms, fees, and permits, not 
a single one of the regulatory officials was even able to detect that the purported 
business was in fact a sham.  Nor was this experience unique.  Djankov, et al, find no 
evidence that increasing the licensing hurdles actually provides any social benefits, 
whether in terms of reduced pollution, greater health and safety, or any other purported 
objective of regulation.
33  Instead, it appears t hat the primary objective of these 
regulations is to enable regulators to collect bribes from supplicants.
34 
Everyone involved, including business owners, employees, and law enforcement 
officials wink at the requirements of legality.  In short, the law no l onger guides 
individual behavior, and the rule of law is defeated in practice.  As de Soto concludes, 
describing the corrosive effect that the need to conduct illegal business has on the 
growth of the rule of law in Peru: 
 
Since 61 percent of the hours worked in Peru are informal, there is 
obviously a long frontier between the informal sector and the state 
authorities.  Some informal businesses are completely   clandestine,  but 
it  is inconceivable that 61 percent of all the work done could be carried  
                                                 
32 De Soto, Mystery of Capital at 30 (cited in note 3). 
33 Djankov, et al, 117 Q J Econ at 23–25 (cited in note 24). 




out illegally without the authorities in some way turning a blind eye.  
This systematic corruption undermines the principle of authority in the 
country as a whole.
35 
 
Moreover, the corruption of the rule of law in such circumstances is obviously not 
confined t o the enforcement level.  Rather, it becomes essential for those trying to 
conduct business to lobby for preferential legislative treatment, such as tax breaks, 
subsidies, and the like, in order to offset or avoid the costs of governmental rule-making 
and bribery.  This process of rent-seeking invariably riddles the laws with exceptions 
and preferential treatment, undermining the generality and equal treatment of the law. 
 
B.  Rule-Based Decision-Making 
 
The second essential characteristic of the rule of law is the requirement of rule-based 
decision-making.  In Justice Antonin Scalia’s terms, this idea is that of “the rule of law 
as a law of rules.”
36  This is related in obvious ways to the characteristic of the rule of 
law as constitutionalism, in that reliance on rules rather than discretionary standards 
helps to constrain arbitrary governmental action because it is easier to monitor the 
government and to determine if it has misbehaved if the scope of governmental activity 
is circumscribed by bright-line rules rather than fuzzy legal standards.  Legal rules 
operate as a sort of trip-wire, which makes it easier to recognize governmental 
overreaching or governmental favoritism.
37  Moreover, rules are necessarily more 
abstract and will apply more equally in future situations, thus they tend to constrain 
governmental discretion better than the alternatives.
38  Clearly-articulated, previously-
                                                 
35 Id at 154.  Djankov, et al., provide further evidence for de Soto's observations, finding in a cross-
country data set that black market and informal economic activity proliferates where regulation of entry is 
heavy.  See Djankov, et al, 117 Q J Econ at 23 (cited in note 24). 
36 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989). 
37 See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism 
and Economic Development, 11 J L Econ & Org 1 (1995).  Weingast notes that for constitutional 
limitations on the s overeign to be effective, the citizenry must be able to recognize and resist 
transgressions against their rights. 
38 Scalia, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1185 (cited in note 36); Hayek, Constitution of Liberty at 149–151 (cited in 




announced rules may also make it easier for independent judges to protect constitutional 
precommitments when encroached upon by political actors.  As Justice Scalia observes, 
"While announcing a firm rule of decision can thus inhibit courts, strangely enough it 
can embolden them as well.  Judges are sometimes called upon to be courageous, 
because they must sometimes stand up to what is generally supreme in a democracy: the 
popular will. . . .  The chances that frail men and women will stand up to their 
unpleasant duty are greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid shield of a firm, 
clear principles enunciated in earlier cases."
39 
Rules also advance the rule of law by distancing rule makers from the merits of 
individual cases, thereby leading to an abstractness and even-handedness in the 
operation of rules.  Rules speak to categories of activity, rather than unique activities by 
unique actors.  At the same time, it protects individual actors from the arbitrariness 
inherent in such decisions, increasing the predictability of their interaction with the rules 
of the state.  As Hayek observes, "[W]hen we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract 
rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to another 
man's will and are therefore free.  It is because the lawgiver does not know the particular 
cases to which his rules will apply, and it is because the judge who applies them has no 
choice in drawing the conclusions that follow from the existing body of rules and the 
particular facts of the case, that it can be said that laws and not men rule."
40 
Thus, “the rule of law as a law of rules” also embodies the additional idea that the 
rule of law aims at providing consistent treatment for similarly-situated actors today, as 
well as those in the future.
41  In so doing, rules limit governmental discretion to pick and 
choose how to apply its rules to given situations or particular actors.  Indeed, rules also 
constrain judges themselves from drawing specious distinctions in future cases, thereby 
furthering the goals of predictability and equality of and predictable legal framework. 
The rule of law requires that the regime of rules governing behavior be sufficiently 
stable so as to allow individuals to form plans and to see them through to completion.  
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The rule of law in this sense is designed to maximize social coordination.
42  The 
purpose of legal rules, as with all rules of behavior, is to allow individuals to form 
expectations about the likely behavior of other individuals in society.  Rule-bound 
decision-making tends to be more predictable than other forms of behavior.  Thus, 
bright-line legal rules also tend to the promotion of economic growth.  Economic 
growth depends on the articulation of spheres of individual autonomy within which 
individuals are free to make use of their local knowledge.
43  The maximum coordination 
of the division of knowledge in the economy will come about through the clear 
articulation of these boundaries of individual autonomy.  Fuzzy boundaries lead to 
unnecessary conflicts between individuals over who holds what rights in particular 
assets.  Clear boundaries reduce this conflict and confusion and thereby encourage 
parties to engage in positive-sum exchange activities.  Thus, the clear articulation of 
legal rules will tend to increase social coordination and economic wealth.
44 
With respect to this function of rule-based decision-making, it is more important 
that the decisions be predictable then that they abide by the mere form of rule-based 
decisions.  Thus, the common law can produce predictable and abstract rules, even if 
they do not have the form of a categorical pronouncement.  All that is necessary is for  
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C.  Neutral Principles 
 
Third, advocates of the rule of law have tended to favor the adoption of “neutral 
principles” for judicial and constitutional decision-making.  Herbert Wechsler defined a 
neutral principle as "one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, 
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is 
involved."
46  Reliance on neutral principles furthers the rule of law by forcing 
governmental decision-makers to articulate their decisions on the basis of principles, 
rather than exercising ad hoc discretion.  In this context, neutral principles of decision-
making include the separation of powers and federalism in c onstitutional 
interpretation,
47 and textualism in statutory interpretation.
48  James Buchanan has 
articulated a similar guiding principle through his insistence on the "generality 
principle" as a means of restraining arbitrary principle.
49  The "generality principle" 
requires that any action by the government be generally applicable to all similarly-
situated individuals, rather than favoring some subsets of the population at the expense 
of others.  Buchanan's generality principle, therefore, can be seen as a corollary to the 
concept of "neutral principles" that guide the legal understanding of the rule of law.  
Hayek also believed that a crucial component of the rule of law was the articulation of 
rules at an abstract and general level and constraints on the ability of the government to 
discriminate among subclasses of individuals.
50 
The separation of powers within the government is also an essential element of the 
rule of law.  This follows from the normative principles of the rule of law.  The rule of 
law requires both the promulgation of prospective rules to apply to future cases and to 
maximize social coordination as well as the equal and general application of these rules 
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to situations as they arise.  This process of ex ante promulgation and ex post decision-
making requires two different bodies tasked for these different purposes.  "It would be 
humanly impossible," Hayek writes, "to separate effectively the laying-down of new 
general rules and their application to particular cases unless these functions were 
performed by different persons or bodies.  This part at least of the doctrine of separation 
of powers must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the rule of law."
51  Perhaps 
most crucial is the existence of an independent judiciary that is insulated from political 
influence and coercion.
52 
The erosion of the separation of powers through the proliferation of administrative 
agencies provides exemplifies the way in which compliance with legal formalities and 
neutral principles furthers the rule of law.  The New Deal’s innovation of combining 
legislative, executive, and judicial authority within a single administrative agency has 
given rise to many of the infringements on the rule of law in the United States.  Indeed, 
it was concerns about the rise of the administrative state in Europe in the Nineteenth-
century that animated Dicey to articulate the link between the rule of law and a free 
society.
53   
In a similar vein, reliance on the implementing the reasonable meaning of the text 
of statutes rather than open-ended inquiry into subjective “legislative intent” is 
consistent with the logic of the rule of law.  In general, textualism promotes the rule of 
law by forcing the judge to rely on the language of the statute and to interpret it 
according to its most reasonable objective reading.  To the extent that legislative history 
may illuminate this objective reasonable understanding of the law, then it may enhance 
predictability.  But an open-ended  ex post search for subjective legislative intent 
undermines rule of  law values.  It is difficult to know how a private party can be 
expected to anticipate how a judge will interpret conflicting legislative pronouncements 
in a given case so as to conform their behavior to the law.  Moreover, such inquiries 
                                                 
51 Id at 210. 
52 Id at 210–11; Raz, Rule of Law (cited in note 25).  Hayek argues that the separation of the legislative 
power from the executive power is not as crucial, so long as both the legislative and executive actions are 
both subject to judicial review.  Thus, it does not matter whether they are combined in one body or 
separated into two bodies, so long as they are both subject to review by an independent judiciary. 




invite discretionary decision-making by judges.  The process of ex post weighing and 
sifting of legislative intent by judges is fundamentally incompatible with the mandate of 
the rule of law to provide ex ante predictability to parties.
54 
 
III.  THE RULE OF LAW IN THE WAKE OF BUSH V. GORE 
 
For several decades, these voices in defense of the rule of law have provided a minority 
view on the subject within the legal academy.  Many leading scholars have denounced 
the rule of law as normatively suspect and unworkable as a practical matter.
55 
The emergence of critical legal studies and its offspring led many scholars to 
criticize the rule of law as and its accompanying virtues, such as equality, formality, and 
rule-based decision-making.
56  It was suggested that these “virtues” were anything but, 
in that they perpetuated inequality and power imbalances in society.  To rectify these 
deep-seated societal problems required broad judicial discretion and context-based 
decision-making, not formal equality and rule-bound analysis.   
Morton H orwitz’s discussion of the rule of law is illustrative of this position.  
Protesting against a Marxist historian’s characterization of the rule of law as “an 
unqualified human good,” Horwitz protests: 
 
I do not see how a Man of the Left can describe the rule of law as “an 
unqualified human good”!  It undoubtedly restrains power, but it also 
prevents power’s benevolent exercise.  It creates formal equality—a not 
inconsiderable virtue—but it  promotes  substantive inequality by 
creating a consciousness that radically separates law from politics, 
means from  ends,  processes from outcomes.  By promoting procedural  
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justice it enables the shrews, the calculating, and the wealthy to 
manipulate its forms to their own advantage.  And it ratifies and 




Indeed, critics of the rule of law argued that not only was the rule of law 
normatively suspect, it was a practical impossibility as well.
58  The inherently ambiguity 
of language
  59 and l egal conceptualism
60 renders judicial decision-making radically 
indeterminate and unpredictable, thereby undermining the aspiration of the rule of law 
to provide clear guidance to governed parties and for the accountability of law-makers 
to the public.  Moreover, given these ambiguities and the lack of effective 
accountability, judges act so as to indulge their ideological and class interest of judges.
61  
Thus, the rule of law not only should not constrain; it could not constrain.  Law is an 
inherently subjective and indeterminate enterprise that contradicted the implicit 
assumptions that grounded the rule of law.  In the words of one critic, the rule of law 
was a "myth" created not to limit government and maximize individual liberty, but 
rather to legitimate political power and official incursions on liberty.
62  These critiques 
left the traditional belief in the rule of law somewhat battered.  Gary Minda writes, 
“There was a loss of belief in a secular and autonomous jurisprudence as the ‘Rule of 
Law’ for all rules.”
63 
In the wake of Bush v. Gore, however, interest in the rule of law has resurfaced in 
American    law   schools.   Identifying  themselves  “teachers  whose   lives  have   been  
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dedicated to the rule of law,” a group of law professors issued a “protest” against the 
Supreme Court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction of the hand-recount of 
ballots in Florida.
64  Justice Stevens echoed this protest in his admonishment to the 
majority opinion in Bush v. Gore, stating that “the identity of the loser is perfectly clear.  
It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”
65 
But this newly-discovered version of rule of law is a dramatically modified 
version of the traditional conception of the rule of law.  Under the traditional 
understanding of the rule of law, it is evident that the Supreme Court acted properly in 
Bush v. Gore.
66  As noted above, the defining characteristics of the rule of law are such 
virtues as equality, transparency, and the governance of official action by pre-existing 
rules.  By these standards, it is clear that the United States Supreme Court acted properly 
in reversing the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in the case.  Florida law had pre-
existing procedures for dealing with challenges to elections.  Although mildly confusing 
and perhaps ill-suited to a presidential election, they nonetheless formed a coherent set 
of rules that governed the situation.  Instead of being bound by these pre-existing rules, 
however, the Florida Supreme Court implied a right for voters to have their votes 
discovered and counted.
67  Regardless of what else the rule of law requires, this attempt 
to change the “rules of the game” in the middle is exactly what is forbidden by the rule 
of law.  Second, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision ceded to local officials broad 
discretion to determine what constituted a legal vote, providing no substantive standards 
or mechanism for review of these decisions.
68  Again, this sort of “unbounded and 
unreviewable power” is incompatible with the rule of law.
69  Even Professor Laurence 
Tribe, in the midst of his criticism of the opinion, pauses to observe, "For the Court the 
spectacle of perhaps another week of state and local officials holding ballots up to the 
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light, followed by the likely display of unabashed partisanship on Capitol Hill, provided 
incentive to intervene.  Those images . . . were obviously the very antithesis of the rule 
of law to the Bush v. Gore majority."
70  As indeed it was—the sight of men and women 
holding punchcard b allots up to the lights to try to count votes will be forever 
emblazoned on the American psyche as one of the most bizarre sights we have seen.  
The utter subjectivity, standardless, and partisan nature of this vote-counting provides a 
strong example of the antithesis of the rule of law.  Had the Florida Supreme Court 
refrained from interfering, the process would have played out in a well-understood 
process, the rules of which had been established over a century before this dispute 
arose.
71  Once the Florida Supreme Court interfered in this process so as to change the 
rule mid-stream and to unleash partisan and discretionary ballot-counting, the United 
States Supreme Court had little alternative but to intervene to reinstate the rule of law.  
Thus, one could criticize the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore on 
other grounds, but its inconsistency with the rule of law is not one of those. 
Others have professed a rededication to the rule of law, but have really just 
redefined the concept in a manner so as to turn it on its head.  Professor Radin, the 
primary author of the rule of law letter, has criticized the traditional view of the rule of 
law for its "pre-existing formal rules applied in a value-free manner."
  72  She argues 
instead that the rule of law be "reinterpreted" so as to "recognize . . . that the law in the 
statute books is not the real law."  Law is a "pragmatic normative practice," and it is 
only if "we take the pragmatic and hermeneutic view of law" that we can understand the 
true v alue of her revised version of the rule of law.  Given the ambiguity of this 
characterization of the "reinterpreted" version of the rule of law, however, it is not clear 
how Professor Radin could state that the Supreme Court defied the rule of law in Bush 
v. Gore.  The logic of the law professor's statement that the Supreme Court defied the 
rule  of  law  rests  on  the  premise  that  the  "correct"  answer  could  be  deduced from  
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existing and standard legal principles.  It is doubtful that application of a "pragmatic and 
hermeneutic" of the rule of law would have proved sufficiently determinate to criticize 
the Supreme Court in the harsh terms advanced by the law professor's letter.  Thus, her 
criticism appears to have implicitly embraced the classical version of the rule of law as 
application of preexisting principles of law.   
Indeed, some notable constitutional law scholars, although critical of  Bush v. 
Gore, refused to sign the law professor's letter because of its implication that a 
determinate "correct" answer was available to the Court and the public.
73  Frank 
Michelman, for instance, bemoans the paralysis of trying to square his skepticism about 
the plausibility of the rule of law with his sympathy for the rule of law letter.
74   Others 
simply swallowed their objections, although later admitting to discomfort over the 
letter's implicit adoption of the classical model of the rule of law.
75  Thus, it is not clear 
where Professor Radin now stands on the matter of the rule of law.  It is evident, 
however, that her earlier "reinterpretation" of the rule of law essentially gutted it of its 
meaning, a meaning accumulated over centuries of historical practice and jurisprudential 
thought. 
Robin West, also a signatory of the law professor’s statement, calls for t he 
rediscovery of her version of the “ideals of the Rule of Law.”  She calls for the 
recognition of “ideals embedded in a Rule of Law that puts law in the service of the 
community rather than the strong; in an idea of rights that actually empowers rather than 
starves and deceives those who possess them; in an idea of justice tied to community 
rather  than to the past or to profit; and lastly, to an idea of the Constitution as 
expressive of democratic urgings for a just and communal happiness, rather than one 
that is expressive of nothing but regressive constraints imposed by pretenders to the 
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throne of objectivity in the name of preferencing a strong individualism over the will of 
peoples.”
 76 
Even if one agrees with Professor West’s substantive goals, it is  difficult to 
understand how these goals embody the principles of the rule of law.  How, for instance, 
can the "democratic urgings for a just and communal happiness" be expressed as neutral, 
purpose-independent rules of conduct that provide the foundation for cooperation and 
economic activity?  How can stability and predictability be furthered by a law that 
changes according to the desires of the "community"?  How can the rule of law be 
vindicated by tying individuals' rights to own and use property, or to v oluntarily 
exchange property, to their relative wealth or status in society?  Indeed, if the rule of law 
can be exemplified in Henry Sumner Maine's famous observation that the rise of the 
modern law can be summed up in the movement from "status to contract," Professor 
West argues for the antithesis—law that defines one's legal entitlements to one's 
socioeconomic status or some other measure of "justice."  Although Professor West 
professes adherence to the rule of law, it is clear that she actually advances a vision 
antithetical to the rule of law and its virtues.
77  Hayek observed that the notion of "social 
justice" is the very antithesis of the rule of law, in that it requires discretionary 
contextual decision-making, rather than subjecting governance abstract and equally-
applied rules.
78  Thus, such laws "are not fully general but single out particular persons 
or groups and confer upon them special rights and duties."
79  The rule of law "is 
concerned neither with the motives nor with the intentions of actions," Oakeshott 
observes.
80  Although West's vision may be normatively desirable on other grounds, it is 
not a vision that resounds in the themes of the rule of law.
81 
In short, contrary to Justice Stevens's rhetoric, the rule of law stands after Bush v. 
Gore.  Indeed, it appears that it is stronger than ever.  It is notable that when law 
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professors objected to what they perceived as arbitrary political action by the Supreme 
Court, they called-upon the traditional model of the rule of law to press their case.  It 
was quickly recognized that the claim that language was ambiguous and that law was all 
politics offered little to object to official governmental action of which they 
disapproved.  Only a principled commitment to the rule of law and commitment to its 
application in practice can provide the bulwark for constraining arbitrary governmental 
action.  Although they were incorrect in their application of the rule of law to the 
situation of Bush v. Gore, it is to be hoped that they now recognize the value of the 
tradition vision of the rule of law and its emphasis on constitutionalism, rule-based 
decision-making, and neutral principles. 
 
IV.  THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
In recent years developing countries have discovered the importance of the rule of law 
in the creation of a free and prosperous society.  The emergence of the "New 
Institutional Economics" school has provided an intellectual framework for 
understanding the influence of the rule of law and other legal and political institutions 
on freedom and economic prosperity.
82 
For most of the twentieth-century, the link between the rule of law and economic 
growth was not obvious.  The apparent economic successes of the Soviet Union in the 
first half of the century gave credence to socialist economic planners.  In the West, 
Fascism provided another model of economic planning and in the rest of the West, the 
Keynesian response to the Great Depression provided justification for intervention and 
regulation of the economy.  Over time the Keynesian model matured  and evolved, 
giving rise to endogenous growth models and other related models.  Regardless of the 
label, however, each of these growth models shared a similar core—a concentration on 
aggregate economic behavior, rather than the incentives and institutions that conditioned 
individual economic activity on the ground. 
                                                 




It was thus believed that with the "scientific" models of macroeconomic planning, 
it was only a matter of time before the economies of undeveloped countries would 
"converge" on those of the West.  Instead, over the past several decades the gap between 
rich and poor has generally widened rather than narrowed.  But this pattern of failure has 
not proved uniform.  Ireland, Botswana, Chile, and the Asian Tigers of Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, have all prospered even as neighboring countries have collapsed 
into misery. 
What distinguishes the success stories from the failures?  The evidence is now 
almost overwhelming that the key distinction is the differing quality of institutions in 
these various countries.
83  Of particular importance appears to be the rule of law.  The 
link between the rule of law and economic growth derives from the micro-level 
incentives created by the conditions sustained by the rule of law.  By constraining 
arbitrary governmental a ctivity, the rule of law provides an institutional framework 
conducive to investment, entrepreneurship, and long-term capital development. 
Armed with the insights of the New Institutional Economics, in recent years 
scholars have begun to try to test the proposition of the relationship between the rule of 
law and economic growth.
84  These scholars have attempted to construct a number of 
empirical measures of the rule of law.  In general, the rule of law encapsulates such 
values as stability in legal rules, restraints on arbitrary governmental action, and safety 
of investment capital.  The documented effect of increasing rule of law values on 
economic growth is robust.  Individuals are more willing to invest in economic growth 
where property rights are stable, contracts are secure, and arbitrary governmental action 
is restrained.  Interestingly, democratic elections are far less important than the rule of 
law in building economic growth.  The reason is straightforward—there is no reason to 
believe that democracy will tend to produce the types of institutions necessary for 
economic growth to occur.  Indeed, democracies may be prone to redistributive and 
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special interest politics that have the tendency to dampen economic growth.  This 
anomaly explains the economic success of countries such as Chile, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong which went through periods of rapid economic growth, notwithstanding a 
complete absence of democratic politics.  Democracy was absent, but rule of law values 
were strong in such countries, providing an environment conducive to economic growth. 
The recognition of the need for the rule of law is increasingly being recognized 
throughout the world.  In Eastern Europe, the fall of Communism has presented those 
countries with the challenge of building an economy, democracy, and constitutional 
order from the ashes of the old regime.  The Communist system was fundamentally 
antithetical to the rule of law.  The rule of law constrains official action by requiring that 
actions be neutral, prospective, and even-handed.  By contrast, the Communist system 
was grounded in the need to empower officials and the community to exercise their 
discretion to make individualized determinations of merit and justice.
85  Indeed, the 
inability to constrain Russian leaders within the confines reaches back to the Czars, 
whose political power grew in part from undermining the stability of property rights and 
using the power of the throne to confiscate the property of political opponents.
86 
Latin America confronted similar problems.  Latin America inherited a legacy of 
arbitrary executive power and a weak tradition of the rule of law.  In addition, just as 
Eastern Europe's progress was retarded as a result of the embrace of Communism, Latin 
America was influenced by a potent brew of socialism and "liberation theology" derived 
from Catholic and Marxist thought.
87   Like  Communism,  these  influences focused on  
collectivist notions such as "social justice" and the like, rather than the individual 
private ordering embedded in the rule of law.  The result was economic stagnation, 
unstable democracy, and political repression.  In recent years, however, many Latin 
American countries have begun taking steps toward growing a rule of law that will 
constrain governmental meddling in the economy  and thereby provide a stable 
foundation for freedom, democracy, and free markets.  As a result, economic indicators 
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have begun to generally move in the desired direction, even as some setbacks (such as in 
Argentina) have slowed progress in some countries. 
 
V.  THE RULE OF LAW, FREEDOM, AND PROSPERITY 
 
It is thus an exciting time for those interested in the influence of institutions for 
economic growth.  Moreover, as the foregoing discussion has indicated, the new 
understanding of economic growth requires an interdisciplinary focus.  The problems 
here are not primarily economic, rather they are legal, constitutional, and political.  As 
Adam Smith observed, if a society provides a stable and sensible legal and political 
framework, the innate genius of human energy and imagination will allow growth to 
take care of itself.
88  As Hayek observed, the tradition of the rule of law has proved to be 
the cornerstone of freedom and prosperity.  The renewed interest in the concept of the 
rule of law presents an opportunity to rediscover the rule of law and its virtues.  To do 
so, however, requires understanding what the rule of law is and why it matters.  To the 
extent that modern scholars succeed in redirecting the rule of law away from its 
traditional meaning, this will undermine the rule of law itself, and with it, the efficacy of 
society ordered by the rule of law. 
                                                 
88 See Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (U of Chicago, 
1976). 